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Abstract
In this paper an alternative Skolemization method is introduced that, for a large class of formulas, is sound and complete with
respect to intuitionistic logic. This class extends the class of formulas for which standard Skolemization is sound and complete and
includes all formulas in which all strong quantifiers are existential. The method makes use of an existence predicate first introduced
by Dana Scott.
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1. Introduction
Skolemization is the replacement of strong quantifiers in a sequent by fresh function symbols, where a strong
quantifier is a positive occurrence of a universal quantifier or a negative occurrence of an existential quantifier.
Skolemization can be considered in the context of either derivability or satisfiability. In this paper we take the former
approach; in the latter, instead of the strong quantifiers, the weak quantifiers are replaced.
Of course, Skolemization applies to formulas as well, but in this paper we will mainly use sequents instead of
formulas, and only at the end list the corresponding results for formulas. Via Skolemization, one obtains a sequent that
is equiderivable with the original sequent and that does not contain any strong quantifiers anymore. This idea goes back
to Skolem, in his seminal paper from 1920. Together with Herbrand’s theorem, Skolemization provides a connection
between predicate and propositional logic. For a prenex formula A = ∃x1∀y1 . . . ∃xn∀yn P(x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn), with
P quantifier free, this correspondence takes the following form: there are terms ti j such that
LK  (⇒ A) ⇔ LK 
(
⇒
m∨
i=1
P(ti1, f1(ti1), . . . , tin , fn(ti1, . . . , tin))
)
,
where LK is the standard Gentzen calculus for classical predicate logic, and the fi are ‘fresh’ function symbols,
not occurring in A. As in classical logic, all formulas have a prenex normal form, this provides a correspondence
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between derivability in predicate and propositional logic, that is, of derivability in predicate logic and in a decidable
theory. Of course, the terms ti j cannot be found recursively in A, as this would make predicate logic decidable.
Nevertheless, Skolemization and Herbrand’s theorem can be very useful, and they are used extensively in automated
theorem proving.
We let SS denote the Skolemization of a sequent S. Note the two different uses of S: in (·)S it stands for the
Skolemization translation; in S it ranges over sequents. We say that Skolemization is sound or complete for L if, in
the following equivalence ⇒ respectively ⇐, holds:
∀S : L  S ⇔ L  SS . (1)
Thus Skolemization is sound and complete for classical logic. For prenex sequents, i.e. sequents in which all formulas
in the sequent are in prenex normal form, it is known that Skolemization is also sound and complete in the setting
of intuitionistic logic [16,17]. Clearly, this does not imply soundness and completeness for all sequents, since not all
sequents have a prenex form in intuitionistic logic. This, however, is not the real problem in this setting: even if one
Skolemizes infix sequents on the spot (see definition in Section 2) Skolemization fails to be complete, but it is sound:
S LJ SS and LJ  SS 
⇒ LJ  S.
The following sequents
∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ (∀x Ax ∨ B) ¬¬∃x Ax ⇒ ∃x¬¬Ax (2)
illustrate these facts. They are not derivable in LJ, but their Skolemizations
∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ Ac ∨ B ¬¬Ac ⇒ ∃x¬¬Ax, (3)
are. Many more counter examples to the completeness of Skolemization can be found in the papers [16,17] by Mints,
in which a full characterization of the sequents for which (1) holds is given. This characterization and its completeness
proof are complicated, which already shows that, in the context of intuitionistic logic, Skolemization is a non-trivial
affair.
In this paper we define an alternative Skolemization method, called eSkolemization and denoted by (·)s , that
is sound and complete for a class of sequents S∃ that is a proper extension of the class of sequents for which
Skolemization is sound and complete. For example, it contains the formulas in (3), and all sequents in which all
strong quantifiers are existential. In the remainder of the introduction, we will discuss the main idea behind this
alternative Skolemization method; all definitions and precise details will follow in the next section.
1.1. The existence predicate and eSkolemization
The method of eSkolemization makes use of a so-called existence predicate first introduced by Dana Scott in
[21]. This predicate, E , denotes whether a term exists: Et means t exists. The idea is that terms may denote partial
objects, but quantifiers range over existing objects only. Using this predicate, one can formulate an extension IQCE of
intuitionistic predicate logic IQC that covers the meaning of this predicate, as was done in [21]. A Gentzen calculus
LJE corresponding to IQCE was first introduced in [1] and will be recalled in Section 3 below. Based on this notion
of existence, eSkolemization is defined as follows: in a sequent, negative occurrences ∃x A(x, y¯) are replaced by
E f (y¯)∧ A( f (y¯), y¯), and positive occurrences ∀x A(x, y¯) by E f (y¯) → A( f (y¯), y¯). Thus, when considering the case
that f (y¯) = c, the existential statements are replaced by “c exists and A(c) holds” and the universal statements are
replaced by “if c exists, then A(c) holds”. The original sequents that we consider are in a languageL; the eSkolemized
sequents are in a language L′ that includes the Skolem functions and the existence predicate. SL denotes the set of
sequents in L.
As it turns out, eSkolemization has many of the nice properties that one would wish any reasonable alternative to
Skolemization to have. For example, it satisfies:
* The eSkolemization Ss of a sequent S is a sequent in which all quantifiers are weak.
* There is a simple, recursive, way in which we can obtain Ss from S.
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We do not have completeness for LJ pure, as this system does not cover the existence predicate occurring in
eSkolemized sequents. We therefore have to move to LJE, and then we do have (Corollary 8.14), for a set of axioms
ΣLand set of sequents S∃ to be defined below, that
∀S ∈ S∃ ∩ SL : LJ S ⇔ ΣLLJE Ss . (4)
The system LJE, together with the axioms ΣL, is a very natural extension of LJ; Scott in [21] gives many reasons for
extending intuitionistic logic in this way. In fact, for sequents in the language L, it is equal to LJ:
∀S ∈ SL : LJ S ⇔ ΣLLJE S. (5)
Moreover, like LJ, ΣLLJE is decidable for quantifier-free formulas (Section 4.10). For all these reasons, one might
say that the eSkolemization method solves the Skolemization problem for LJ with respect to existential quantifiers.
Finally, let us remark that (4) also holds for the system LJE itself (Theorem 8.13):
∀S ∈ S∃ ∩ SL : ΣLLJE S ⇔ ΣLLJE Ss . (6)
1.2. Alternative approaches
In the context of automated theorem proving, the lack of Skolemization in intuitionistic logic is often overcome
by putting certain restrictions on proofs. Here, not all proofs in IQC are considered, but only a proper subset P of its
proofs, for which it is shown that
IQC  A ⇔ ∃P ∈ P (P is a proof in IQC of AS).
Approaches along these lines have, for example, been introduced in [9,10,15,18,22].
In this paper we have taken a different approach. Our aim was to define an alternative Skolemization method that
satisfies properties that standard Skolemization has in classical logic: properties like the ∗s and (4) above, and for
which the (partial) completeness proof does not put restrictions on proofs, like the P above. Of course, our final aim
is to have a method that satisfies (4) for all sequents. Although our results are still partial in this respect, we think that
they are of interest as, in contrast to most approaches in automated theorem proving so far, they provide a canonical
approach to Skolemization in intuitionistic logic which does not put restrictions on the proofs allowed and which,
moreover, is based on a clear intuition about what terms in intuitionistic logic should mean. This intuition will be
explained in more detail in the next section.
1.3. Section contents
Section 2 contains the definitions of Skolemization and eSkolemization and explains the idea behind the latter.
Section 3 introduces the Gentzen calculi LJE and LJE(ΣL). Section 4 recalls results from [1,2] on the proof theory
of these calculi. In Section 6, an alternative Kripke-style semantics is introduced, which is shown to be sound and
complete with respect to LJE(ΣL) in Section 7. In Section 8, the class of sequents S∃ is defined and it is shown that,
for this class, eSkolemization is sound and complete. Section 8.16 contains examples that show that eSkolemization
is not complete with respect to all sequents. Section 9 contains the translation of the obtained results to IQC, i.e. to
the setting of formulas.
2. Skolemization and eSkolemization
In this section we give the definitions of classical Skolemization (·)S , introduce the alternative Skolemization
method (·)s , and discuss the ideas underlying the latter definition and the proofs to come.
2.1. Preliminaries
We consider languages L, Ls , Le and Les as explained in the introduction: Ls is the Skolem language for L—an
extension ofL by function symbols that are not in L, for every arity infinitely many. Constants are considered as 0-ary
function symbols. Le is the extension of L by the existence predicate E and by infinitely many variables. Les is the
extension of Ls by the existence predicate E and infinitely many variables. Thus L ⊆ Le and L ⊆ Ls ⊆ Les . Most
of the time, we denote Les by L′ to decrease the number of indices. Thus L′ is the biggest language that we work
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with. If we talk about a formula without specifying which language it is in, it is tacitly assumed to be in L′. None
of the languages contain equality; see the last section for the reason for this. We assume that L contains at least one
constant and no variables. The former requirement is needed to make the construction of the reduction trees work; see
Definition 7.6, the remark on the case R∀. The latter requirement will be clarified after the introduction of the Gentzen
calculi. Given a set D, L′D denotes the language L′ extended by the elements of D, which are considered as constants
of the language; similarly for LD .
The languages all contain ⊥, and ¬A is defined as A → ⊥. A, B, C, D, E, ... range over formulas in Les , s, t, ...
over terms in Les . Γ ,Δ,Π range over finite multisets of formulas in Les . A formula is closed when it does not contain
free variables. A sequent Γ ⇒ Δ is closed if all formulas in Γ ∪Δ are closed. A sequent is in L′ if all its formulas are
in L′. For a formula A in which x does not occur as a bound variable, we write A[t/x] for the result of substituting
t for x everywhere in A. When we write A(x), then A(t) denotes the result of replacing some, namely the indicated
occurrences of x in A by t . Similar notions are defined for sequents. Proofs are assumed to be trees. We assume
that, in a proof, bound variables and eigenvariables are all different. We often write Ax for A(x). d¯ ranges over finite
sequences of elements d1, . . . , dn . For a set D, we write d¯ ∈ D when all elements of d¯ are in D, and d¯ 
∈ D when
some element of d¯ is not in D. TL′ denotes the set of terms in L′, FL′ denotes the set of formulas in L′, and SL′
denotes the set of sequents in L′. Similarly for the other three languages.
The notion of positive and negative occurrences of a formula are inductively defined as follows. If A is an atom,
A occurs positively in A. If A occurs positively (negatively) in B , then it occurs positively (negatively) in B ∧ C ,
C ∧ B , B ∨ C , C ∨ B , C → B , ∀x B and ∃x B , and negatively (positively) in B → C . Similar notions s are defined
for sequents Γ ⇒ Δ by considering them as formulas∧Γ →∨Δ.
2.2. Skolemization
Definition 2.3. Q denotes either ∀ or ∃. A strong quantifier in a formula A is the occurrence of a subformula of the
form Qx B(x) in A, where Q = ∀ if the occurrence is positive, and Q = ∃ if the occurrence is negative. The first
strong quantifier in A is the first strong quantifier in A when reading A from left to right.
The Skolem sequence of a formula A is a sequence of formulas A = A1, . . . , An = AS such that An does
not contain any strong quantifiers and Ai+1 is the result of replacing the first strong quantifier Qx B(x) in Ai by
B
( f (y1, . . . , yn)), where f ∈ Ls\L does not occur in Ai , and the weak quantifiers in the scope of which Qx B(x)
occurs are exactly Qy1, . . . , Qyn . The formula AS is called the Skolemization of A. In the proofs to come, it is
necessary to define a Skolemization sequence in this deterministic way because, in the proof, we need that the replaced
formula does not occur in the scope of any other strong quantifiers anymore.
We carry over the definition of Skolemization to sequents by considering a sequent Γ ⇒ Δ as the formula∧
Γ →∨Δ. Define
M ≡def {S ∈ SL | S closed, LJ  S ⇔ LJ  SS}. (7)
As is well-known for classical predicate logic,
LK  S if and only if LK  SS . (8)
This is no longer true for LJ, as the examples (2) above showed.
2.4. eSkolemization
In this section we introduce the notion of eSkolemization. We will first present the definition and afterwards explain
the idea behind it.
Definition 2.5. The eSkolem sequence of a formula A is a sequence of formulas A = A1, . . . , An = As such that An
does not contain any strong quantifiers and Ai+1 is the result of replacing the first strong quantifier Qx B(x) in Ai by
E f (y1, . . . , yn) → B
( f (y1, . . . , yn)) if Q = ∀
and by
E f (y1, . . . , yn) ∧ B
( f (y1, . . . , yn)) if Q = ∃,
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where f ∈ Ls\L does not occur in Ai , and the weak quantifiers in the scope of which Qx B(x) occurs are exactly
Qy1, . . . , Qyn . Again, we carry over this definition to sequents by considering a sequent Γ ⇒ Δ as the formula∧
Γ →∨Δ.
Note that, if Qx B(x) is not in the scope of any weak quantifier, then f is a constant. Observe that, in
(e)Skolemization, occurrences are replaced. For example, if S = (⇒ ∀x Bx ∧ ∀x Bx), then Ss is (⇒ Ec ∧ Bc ∧
Ed ∧ Bd) and not (⇒ Ec ∧ Bc ∧ Ec ∧ Bc). Note that the (e)Skolemization of S is unique up to renaming of the
Skolem functions, therefore we speak of the (e)Skolemization of S.
Example 2.6.
S Ss
⇒ ∀x P(x) ⇒ Ec → P(c)
∃x P(x) ⇒ ∃x R(x) Ec ∧ P(c) ⇒ ∃x R(x)
∃x P(x) ⇒ ∀x R(x) Ec ∧ P(c) ⇒ (Ed → R(d))
⇒ ∀x∃y P(x, y) ⇒ Ec → ∃y P(c, y)
⇒ ∃x∀y P(x, y) ⇒ ∃x(E f (x) → P(x, f (x))).
Once all the systems have been defined, we will see that
S LJE Ss .
Furthermore, we will see that, for the first counterexample in (2):

LJ ∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ (∀x Ax ∨ B) and ΣL 
LJE ∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ ((Ec → Ac) ∨ B).
This shows that, although the sequent is a counterexample for the completeness of Skolemization, it no longer is so
for eSkolemization. The same holds for the second sequent in (2).
The guiding idea behind eSkolemization is the following. In classical logic, terms range over the same domain as
quantifiers. For intuitionistic logic, this is no longer the case: by the definition of Kripke models, (the interpretations
of) terms have to be elements of the domain at the root of a model, while quantifiers might range over objects that
only exist at a later stage. The following example illustrates this.
Consider the second sequent S = ¬¬∃x Px ⇒ ∃x¬¬Px in (2) and its Skolemization and eSkolemization:
SS = ¬¬Pc ⇒ ∃x¬¬Px Ss = ¬¬(∃c ∧ Pc) ⇒ ∃x¬¬Px .
A counter model K to S is given by a two-node Kripke model k  l with respective domains Dk = {0} and
Dl = {0, 1}, and where we force P(1) only at l and P(0) nowhere. Then
k  ¬¬∃x Px k 
 ∃x¬¬Px .
Since the interpretation of c has to be an element of every domain, it can only be interpreted as 0. This shows the
difference between the range of the quantifier and that of the constant: c can only be 0, while ∃ ranges over 0 and 1.
Also, indeed we have K 
 S but K  SS , because K  ¬Pc, and therefore
k  ¬¬Pc → ∃x¬¬Px .
In the presence of the existence predicate, the situation changes. As we will see, in this setting we can assume that
Kripke models have constant domains. Quantifiers will range over existing objects only, and not every element will
exist at the root, but every element that will ever occur in the model already has a name in the root. Therefore, terms
and quantifiers range over the same domain.
Given this, the (partial) completeness proof for eSkolemization will be semantic: given a counter model K to S, we
will construct a counter model K ′ to Ss . We will illustrate the construction of such a counter model via the example
above. Let the set of nodes of K and K ′ be the same. The domains at k and l are the union of all domains, i.e.
D′k = D′l = {0, 1} (constant domains!). The interpretation of c is 1 and the interpretation of P is as in K . Define
k 
 E1 l  E1.
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It does not matter where we force E0 and where not in the model. Note that
k  ¬¬(Ec ∧ Pc) k 
 ∃x¬¬Px .
The latter follows because k 
 E1 ∧ P1 and k 
 E0 ∧ P0. Hence K ′ 
 Ss , as desired.
This example roughly illustrates how we will proceed in the completeness proof for eSkolemization in
Theorems 8.1 and 8.13. One subtlety still has to be addressed. As the example shows, it is essential that some terms
might not exist at every node in the model, i.e. that k 
 Ed for some d in the domain of k. This should, in particular,
be possible for terms in which Skolem functions occur. For the original sequent, however, we can assume that all its
terms exist. This is where the set ΣL comes into play. Our original sequents will be in the language L and we will
assume that all terms in L exist:
ΣL= {⇒ Et | t a term in L}.
Given this set of axioms, LJE and LJ are the same for formulas in L (Theorem 4.8). The essential point is that we do
not assume the existence of terms containing Skolem functions, i.e. of terms in L′. This allows the kind of counter
models constructed in the example above.
The discussion above indicates how we want to use the existence predicate. This simple idea is what underlies the
main results in the paper, which, despite this simplicity, turn out to have rather complicated proofs. Although not in
the setting of Skolemization, logics containing an existence predicate have been studied before, and, for example, [21]
provides many arguments in favor of this logic over IQC; see Section 5 for more on this.
3. The Gentzen calculus LJE
In this section we define the system LJE, an analogue of LJ for intuitionistic predicate logic extended by the
existence predicate that covers the intuition that Et means t exists. Such a system was first introduced by Scott in [21],
but then in a Hilbert-style formulation, and called IQCE. The Gentzen calculus for this system was first introduced
by the authors in [1].
Given an existence predicate, terms, including variables, typically range over existing as well as non-existing
elements, while the quantifiers range over existing objects only. Proofs are assumed to be trees. We assume that, in a
proof, bound variables and eigenvariables are all different.
The system LJE
Ax Γ , P ⇒ P (P atomic) L⊥ Γ ,⊥ ⇒ C
Γ , A, B ⇒ C
L∧ Γ , A ∧ B ⇒ C
Γ ⇒ A Γ ⇒ BR∧ Γ ⇒ A ∧ B
Γ , A ⇒ C Γ , B ⇒ C
L∨ Γ , A ∨ B ⇒ C
Γ ⇒ AiR∨ i = 0, 1
Γ ⇒ A0 ∨ A1
Γ , A → B ⇒ A Γ , B ⇒ C
L→ Γ , A → B ⇒ C
Γ , A ⇒ B
R→ Γ ⇒ A → B
Γ ,∀x Ax, At ⇒ C Γ ,∀x Ax ⇒ Et
L∀ Γ ,∀x Ax ⇒ C
Γ , Ey ⇒ Ay
R∀ ∗Γ ⇒ ∀x A[x/y]
Γ , Ay, Ey ⇒ C
L∃ ∗Γ , ∃x A[x/y] ⇒ C
Γ ⇒ At Γ ⇒ EtR∃ Γ ⇒ ∃x Ax
Γ ⇒ A Γ , A ⇒ CCut Γ ⇒ C
Here (∗) denotes the condition that y does not occur free in Γ and C .
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We write LJE  S if the sequent S is derivable in LJE. For a set of sequents S, we say that S is derivable from S
in LJE, and write S LJE S if S is derivable in LJE extended by axioms S . We define
LJE(S) ≡def {S ∈ SL′ | S LJE S}.
In the system LJE, no existence of any term is assumed. This implies, for example, that we cannot derive ⇒ ∃x Ex ,
or ∀x Px ⇒ Pt , but we can derive ∀x Px, Et ⇒ Pt . For ⇒ ∃x Ex , note that we can derive it from (⇒ Et). Recall
that our final aim is that terms in L exist, while the other terms in general do not. Therefore, we define the following
sets of sequents:
ΣL≡def {Γ ⇒ Et | t ∈ TL,Γ a multiset in L′}.
Note that, for all sequents Γ ⇒ Et in ΣL, t is a closed term, and that, because of the assumptions on L, ΣLcontains
at least one sequent. We define
LJE(ΣL) ≡def {S ∈ SL′ | ΣLLJE S}.
We sometimes write  for LJE when it is clear from the context, and we often write Lfor LJE(ΣL), theL indicating
that we assume the terms in L to exist.
Example 3.1.

LJE⇒ ∃x Ex LJE⇒ ∀x Ex .
L⇒ ∃x Ex ∧ ∀x Ex .
In Proposition 4.8, the relation between LJ and LJE is explained.
It is easy to see that
Lemma 3.2. LJE  A ⇒ As. Thus also
L S ⇒ L Ss .
Remark 3.3. It is now simple to see that the examples (2) are counterexamples to the completeness of Skolemization,
but not so for eSkolemization:

LJ ¬¬∃x Ax ⇒ ∃x¬¬Ax,
LJ ¬¬Ac ⇒ ∃x¬¬Ax 
L¬¬(Ec → Ac) ⇒ ∃x¬¬Ax .

LJ ∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ (∀x Ax ∨ B),
LJ ∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ (Ac ∨ B) 
L∀x(Ax ∨ B) ⇒ ((Ec → Ac) ∨ B).
4. Properties of LJE
4.1. Uniqueness
Observe that, given another predicate E ′ that satisfies the same rules of LJE as E , it follows that
L Et ⇒ E ′t and L E ′t ⇒ Et .
We namely have that L (⇒ ∀x Ex ∧∀x E ′x), and also L (∀x Ex, E ′t ⇒ Et) and L (∀x E ′x, Et ⇒ E ′t). Finally,
two cuts do the trick. This shows that the existence predicate E is unique up to provable equivalence.
4.2. Cut elimination
In this section we recall some results from [1] that show that LJE and LJE(ΣL) have a restricted form of cut
elimination and have weakening and contraction. Some of these results we will need later on; the others are recalled to
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show that the systems that we consider are well-behaved. The proofs of these results are more or less straightforward,
where the ECut theorem, which shows that the systems allow some partial cut-elimination, is the most involved, as
usual.
Lemma 4.3 (Substitution Lemma).
For L ∈ {LJE(ΣL), LJE}:
If P is a proof in L of a sequent S in L′ in which y occurs free, and if t is a term in L′ that does not contain
eigenvariables or bound variables of P, then P[t/y] is a proof of S[t/y] in L.
Lemma 4.4 ([1] Weakening Lemma).
For L ∈ {LJE(ΣL), LJE}: L  Γ ⇒ C implies L  Γ , A ⇒ C.
Lemma 4.5 ([1] Contraction Lemma).
For L ∈ {LJE(ΣL), LJE}: L  Γ , A, A ⇒ C implies L  Γ , A ⇒ C.
Theorem 4.6 ([1]) ECut Theorem).
For L ∈ {LJE(ΣL), LJE}: every sequent in L′ provable in L has a proof in L in which the only cuts are instances of
the ECut rule:
Γ ⇒ Et ∈ ΣL Γ , Et ⇒ CECut: Γ ⇒ C.
In particular, LJE has cut-elimination.
Corollary 4.7 ([1]). LJE(ΣL) is consistent.
The cut-elimination theorem allows us to prove the following correspondence between LJ and LJE(ΣL).
Proposition 4.8 ([1]). For all closed sequents S in L:
LJ S if and only if L S.
Corollary 4.9. For all sequents S ∈M:
LJ S if and only if L Ss .
(The definition ofM is given in Section 2.3.)
Proof. The direction from left to right follows from Lemma 3.2 and the proposition above. For the direction from
right to left, assume L Ss . It is not difficult to see that replacing all expression of the form Et in Ss by  yields a
formula S′ that is equivalent to SS and derivable in LJ. Hence LJ S. 
4.10. Decidability and interpolation
Proposition 4.11. For quantifier-free closed sequents, the relations LJE and Lare decidable.
Proof. Using the theorem on ECuts above, with induction to the depth of a proof, show that, when ti are terms that
do not occur in a quantifier-free sequent Γ ⇒ C unless in an element of Γ of the form Es, then
L Et1, . . . , Etn,Γ ⇒ C implies L Et2, . . . , Etn,Γ ⇒ C,
and similarly for LJE. 
Recall that we say that a single conclusion Gentzen calculus L has interpolation if, whenever L  Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ C ,
there exists an I in the common language of Γ1 and Γ2 ∪ {C} such that
Γ1 L I and I,Γ2 L C.
In the context of existence logics, the common language of two multisets Γ1 and Γ2 consists of all variables, , ⊥ and
E , and all predicates and non-variable terms that occur both in Γ1 and Γ2.
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We say that a Gentzen calculus L satisfies the Beth definability property if, whenever A(R) is a formula with R an
n-ary relation symbol in a language L, and R′, R′′ are two relation symbols not in L such that
L  A(R′) ∧ A(R′′) ⇒ ∀x¯(R′ x¯ ↔ R′′ x¯),
then there is a formula S in L such that
L  ∀x¯(Sx¯ ↔ Rx¯).
Theorem 4.12 ([2]). LJE and LJE(ΣL) have interpolation.
Theorem 4.13 ([2]). LJE and LJE(ΣL) satisfy the Beth definability property.
5. IQCE and IQCE+
As remarked above, given an existence predicate, in our systems, variables typically range over existing as well
as non-existing elements, while quantifiers range over existing objects only. As to the choice of the domain for the
variables, there have been different approaches. Scott in [21] introduces a system IQCE for the predicate language
with the distinguished predicate E , in which variables range over all objects, like in LJE and LJE(ΣL). On the other
hand, Beeson in [5] discusses a system in which variables range over existing objects only.
The formulation of the system IQCE in [21], where logic with an existence predicate was first introduced, was in
Hilbert style, where the axioms and rules for the quantifiers are the following:
∀x Ax ∧ Et → At
...
B ∧ Ey → Ay
*B → ∀x Ax
...
Ay ∧ Ey → B
*∃x Ax → B
At ∧ Et → ∃x Ax
Here, the ∗ are the usual side conditions on the eigenvariable y. The system that Scott considered also contained
equality, but, as our systems do not, we do not discuss it here.
The following formulation of IQCE in natural deduction style first appeared in [31]; it can also be found in [29].
We call the system NDE (Natural Deduction Existence). It consists of the axioms and connective rules of the standard
natural deduction formulation of IQC, where the quantifier rules are replaced by the following rules:
[Ey]
...
Ay∀I *∀x Ax
...
∀x Ax
...
Et∀E At
...
At
...
Et∃I ∃x Ax
...
∃x Ax
[Ay][Ey]
...
C∃E *C
Again, the ∗ are the usual side conditions on the eigenvariable y. It is easy to see that the following holds.
Fact 5.1. ∀A ∈ FL′ : IQCE A if and only if NDE A if and only if LJE⇒ A.
Existence logic, in which terms range over all objects while quantifiers and variables only range over existing objects,
is denoted by IQCE+ and has, for example, been used by Beeson in [5]. The logic is the result of leaving out Ey in
the two rules for the quantifiers in IQCE given above and adding Ex as axioms for all variables x . A formulation in
natural deduction style is obtained from NDE by replacing the ∀I and ∃E by their standard formulations for IQC and
adding Ex as axioms for all variables x . We call the system NDE+. There are some details concerning substitutions
that we skip here, and only state:
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Fact 5.2. ∀A ∈ FL:
IQCE+ A iff NDE+ A iff {Γ ⇒ Ex | x a variable, Γ a multiset} LJE⇒ A.
In [31], Unterhalt thoroughly studied the Kripke semantics of these logics and proved, respectively, completeness
and strong completeness for the systems IQCE and IQCE+. In Section 6 our semantics is introduced, and Section 7
discusses his and our completeness results.
6. Semantics
Here, we introduce the semantics that we are going to use. This consists of Kripke models equipped with a notion
of forcing, called existence forcing and denoted by e, that slightly deviates from standard forcing and for which
LJE(ΣL) is sound and complete, as we will show in the next section. The reason that we have to use a nonstandard
notion of forcing is that we have to incorporate the different interpretation of the quantifiers in LJE and LJE(ΣL).
In [31], Unterhalt proved strong completeness for IQCE+ and IQCE with respect to standard forcing, as explained
in [29]. These results are different from ours, since we work with a nonstandard forcing method and with a different
proof system.
A classical existence structure for L′D is a pair (D, Ik) such that D is a set and Ik is a map from L′D such that
Ik(E) is a nonempty unary predicate on D;
for every n-ary predicate P in L′, Ik(P) is an n-ary predicate on D;
for every n-ary function f in L′D , Ik( f ) is an n-ary function from D to D (constants are considered as 0-ary
functions);
Ik(a) = a for every constant a ∈ D.
For any closed L′D-term t , Ik(t) denotes the interpretation of t under Ik in D, which is defined as usual. Ik(t1, . . . , tn)
is short for Ik(t1), . . . , Ik(tn). Ik is extended to an interpretation of all formulas in L′D , as usual. For L′D-sentences A,
let (D, Ik ) |= A denote that A holds in the structure (D, Ik ), which is defined as usual for classical structures.
A frame is a pair (W,) where W is a nonempty set and is a partial order on W with a root k0. A Kripke existence
model on a frame F = (W,) is a triple K = (F, D, I ), where D is a nonempty set called the domain, and I is
a collection {Ik | k ∈ W }, such that the (D, Ik) are classical existence structures for L′D that satisfy the persistency
requirements: for all k, l ∈ W , for all predicates P(x¯) in L, and for all closed L′D-terms t¯ ,
k  l ⇒ ( (D, Ik) |= P(t¯) ⇒ (D, Il ) |= P(t¯) ),
k  l ⇒ Ik(t¯) = Il(t¯).
In particular, Ik(t) = Ik0 (t) for all k and all closed terms t in L′D . Therefore, we sometimes write I (t) instead of
Ik(t). Note that our Kripke models have constant domains! We can do so because the notion of forcing defined below
restricts the range of quantifiers to existing objects, which may be a different set from node to node. A similar approach
to Kripke semantics with constant domains can be found in [14]. It is not related to the existence predicate, or to the
proof system, but provides a correspondence between Kripke models and Kripke models with constant domains using
one distinguished predicate that more or less plays the role of the existence predicate in our setting.
Given a Kripke existence model K = (D,, I ), the existence forcing relation is defined as follows, and denoted
by e. For our purposes, it suffices to define the forcing relation K , k e A at node k inductively only for sentences
in L′D . When K is clear from the context, we write k e A for K , k e A. For predicates P(x¯) in L′ (including E)
and closed L′D-terms t , we put
K , k e P(t¯) ≡def (D, Ik) |= P(t¯).
We extend K , k e A to all sentences in L′D in the usual way for connectives, but differently for the quantifiers:
k 
e ⊥
k e A ∧ B iff k e A and k e B
k e A ∨ B iff k e A or k e B
k e A → B iff ∀k ′  k : k ′ e A ⇒ k ′ e B
k e ∃x A(x) iff ∃d ∈ D k e Ed ∧ A(d)
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k e ∀x A(x) iff ∀d ∈ D : k e Ed → A(d).
Note that the upwards persistency requirement for sentences A is fulfilled:
k  l ∧ k e A ⇒ l e A.
Also note that
k e ∀x A(x) ⇔ ∀l  k∀d ∈ D l e Ed → Ad.
As all forcing and Kripke models in this paper will be existence forcing and Kripke existence models, we leave out
the word existence most of the time. For sentences A in L′D , we say that A is forced in K , K e A if, for all nodes k,
K , k e A. For a formula A(x¯), K e A(x¯) if K e A[a¯/x¯] for all a¯ ∈ D. We call K an L-model when
∀t ∈ TL : K e Et .
We say that A is L-forced, written eL A, when K e A for all L-models K .
6.1. The forcing of infinite sequents
In the next section we will define an analogue of LJE fitted to deal with infinite sequents, i.e. sequents Γ ⇒ Δ in
which Γ andΔ may be infinite. Therefore, we define here already the notion of forcing for sequents that are possibly
infinite. We write k e Γ , meaning that k e A for all A ∈ Γ .
We say that a sequent S = (Γ ⇒ Δ) in L′D , in which all free variables are among x¯ , is forced at K and write
K e S, when for all a¯ ∈ D and all k: k e B[a¯/x¯] for some B ∈ Δ or k 
e A[a¯/x¯] for some A ∈ Γ . A sequent
S = (Γ ⇒ Δ) is forced, written e S, when K e S for all models K . We say that S is L-forced, written eL S, when
K e S for all L-models K . We say that a collection of sequents S (L-)forces S, S e S, when, for all (L-)models
K , if K e S′ for all S′ ∈ S, then K e S.
Note that, for finite sequents (Γ ⇒ Δ),
K e (Γ ⇒ Δ) iff K e
(∧
Γ →
∨
Δ
)
,
and thus
eLΓ ⇒ Δ iff eL
(∧
Γ →
∨
Δ
)
.
7. Soundness and completeness
In this section we show that LJE(ΣL) is sound and complete with respect to e. The proof uses a Gentzen calculus
LJE∞ that is an alternative to LJE for infinite sequents whose succedent can contain more than one formula. The
proof follows the pattern of the completeness proof for LJ as given in [27]. This method is similar to that of Beth
tableaux. The idea will be explained below.
7.1. An alternative Gentzen calculus
LJE∞ is similar to LJE, but has structural rules. Because of this, in L→ and L∀ the principal formula does not
have to occur in the hypotheses. For soundness, in the rules R∀ and R→ the antecedent may still contain only one
formula, as in LJE.
Important. In this section, sequents are possibly infinite.
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The system LJE∞
Ax Γ , P ⇒ P,Δ (P atomic) L⊥ Γ ,⊥ ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ ΔLW Γ , A ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ ΔRW Γ ⇒ A,Δ
Γ , A, A ⇒ Δ
LC Γ , A ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ A, A,Δ
RC Γ ⇒ A,Δ
Γ , A, B ⇒ Δ
L∧ Γ , A ∧ B ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ A,Δ Γ ⇒ B,Δ
R∧ Γ ⇒ A ∧ B,Δ
Γ , A ⇒ Δ Γ , B ⇒ Δ
L∨ Γ , A ∨ B ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ A, B,Δ
R∨ Γ ⇒ A ∨ B,Δ
Γ ⇒ A,Δ Γ , B ⇒ Δ
L→ Γ , A → B ⇒ Δ
Γ , A ⇒ B
R→ Γ ⇒ A → B
Γ , At ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Et,Δ
L∀ Γ ,∀x Ax ⇒ Δ
Γ , Ey ⇒ Ay
R∀ ∗Γ ⇒ ∀x A[x/y]
Γ , Ay, Ey ⇒ Δ
L∃ ∗Γ , ∃x A[x/y] ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ At,Δ Γ ⇒ Et,Δ
R∃ Γ ⇒ ∃x Ax,Δ
Γ ⇒ A Γ , A ⇒ Δ
Cut Γ ⇒ Δ
We write LJE∞(ΣL) for the system obtained from LJE∞ by adding the sequents ΣL as axioms. We say that LJE∞
derives Γ ⇒ Δ, LJE∞ Γ ⇒ Δ when there are finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and Δ′ ⊆ Δ such that LJE∞ (Γ ′ ⇒ Δ′). We say
that a set of finite sequents S derives a sequent S in LJE∞ when there are finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and Δ′ ⊆ Δ such that
Γ ′ ⇒ Δ′ is derivable in the system LJE∞ to which the sequents in S are added as axioms. We have similar notions
for LJE∞(ΣL). We often write ∞L for LJE∞(ΣL) .
We leave it to the reader to verify that the following holds, using the fact that LJE has weakening and contraction
(Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5):
Lemma 7.2. For finite Γ and Δ: ∞L Γ ⇒ Δ if and only if LΓ ⇒ Δ.
7.3. Soundness
Theorem 7.4. For all sets of finite closed sequents S and all closed sequents S in L′:
S ∞L S implies S eL S.
Proof. We only consider the case that S is empty and that S is a sequent with at most one formula in the succedent and
we leave the other cases to the reader. For a smooth induction, we prove that all axioms of LJE∞(ΣL) are L-forced,
and that, for all its rules, if the hypotheses of the rule are L-forced, then so is the conclusion. The case of the axioms
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is simple and so are most of the rules. We treat the axiom ΣLand the rules R∀ and R∃. Let K be an L-model. Recall
that we write k e Γ , meaning that k e A for all A ∈ Γ .
Consider a sequent Γ ⇒ Et in ΣL. Hence t is a closed term in TL. Let x¯ be all the free variables that occur in Γ .
By assumption on L-models, it follows that K e (Γ ⇒ Et)[a¯/x¯] for all a¯ ∈ D.
For R∀, suppose that e Π , Ey ⇒ Ay and y not free in Π . Consider k in K , suppose that the free variables in Π
and Ay are among x¯ y, let a¯ ∈ D, and assume k e Π [a¯/x¯]. We have to show that
∀d ∈ D : k e (Ed → Ad)[a¯/x¯].
Therefore, consider l  k and d ∈ D such that l e Ed . We have to show that l e Ad[a¯/x¯]. As the side condition
on R∀ implies that y does not occur free in Π , we have l e (Π ∧ Ey)[a¯d/x¯ y]. As e Π , Ey ⇒ Ay, this implies
l e Ay[a¯d/x¯ y], that is, l e Ad[a¯/x¯].
For R∃, suppose e Π ⇒ At , e Π ⇒ Et , and let all free variables of Π and At be among x¯ , pick a¯ ∈ D and
assume k e Π [a¯/x¯]. We have to show that
∃d ∈ D : k e (Ed ∧ Ad)[a¯/x¯].
Since e Π ⇒ Et and k e Π [a¯/x¯], this gives k e Et[a¯/x¯]. Similarly, k e At[a¯/x¯]. Let d = t[a¯/x¯]. Then we
have k e (Ed ∧ Ad)[a¯/x¯], as desired. 
7.5. Completeness
As mentioned above, the completeness proof given follows the pattern of the completeness proof for LJ as given in
[27]. The idea is that, if a sequent is underivable, we apply the inference rules in the reverse order as long as possible,
resulting in a so-called reduction tree with at least one branch along which all sequents are underivable. This branch
will be a node in the Kripke model, the model that we obtain by repeating this process, and which will refute the
sequent we started with. We first have to introduce the notion of a reduction tree, a notion similar to that of a Beth
tableau.
Definition 7.6. Given a (possibly infinite) sequent S, the reduction tree for S is inductively defined as follows. Recall
that we assumed that L contains at least one constant and no variables, and that L′ has an infinite set of variables.
Furthermore, we assume that, at every stage of the construction, we have infinitely many fresh variables ofL′ available,
i.e. variables that do not occur in the sequents constructed so far.
The construction of the reduction tree for S = (Γ ⇒ Δ) consists of repeated application of steps 0,1, 2, . . . , 8,
which correspond to inference rules of LJE∞ without the structural rules, R∀ and R→. We leave it to the reader to
check that, at every stage of the construction, we deal with countably infinite sequents only, i.e. sequents for which
the antecedent and succedent contain countably infinite many formulas only.
Step n = 0: write S at the bottom of the tree.
Step n > 0: if every leaf is an axiom of LJE or a sequent in ΣL, then stop. If this is not the case, then this stage is
defined according to n ≡ 0, 1, . . . , 8 mod 9. Let Π ⇒ Λ be any leaf of the tree defined at stage n − 1.
n ≡ 0: L∧ reduction. Let α be a set such that {Ai0 ∧ Ai1 | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Π with
outermost logical symbol ∧ to which no reduction has yet been applied. Then, above Π ⇒ Λ, write the sequent
Π , {Ai0, Ai1 | i ∈ α} ⇒ Λ.
n ≡ 1: R∧ reduction. Let α be a set such that {Ai0 ∧ Ai1 | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Λ with
outermost logical symbol ∧ to which no reduction has yet been applied. Then, above Π ⇒ Λ, write all sequents of
the form
Π ⇒ {Ai f (i) | i ∈ α},Λ
for any map f : α → {0, 1}.
n ≡ 2: L∨ reduction. Defined in a similar way to R∧ reduction.
n ≡ 3: R∨ reduction. Defined in a similar way to L∧ reduction.
282 M. Baaz, R. Iemhoff / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 142 (2006) 269–295
n ≡ 4: L→ reduction. Let α be a set such that {Ai → Bi | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Π with
outermost logical symbol → to which no reduction has yet been applied. Then, for all f : α → {0, 1}, write above
Π ⇒ Λ the sequent
Π , {Bi | f (i) = 1} ⇒ {Ai | f (i) = 0},Λ.
n ≡ 5: L∀ reduction. Let α be a set such that {∀xi Ai (xi ) | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Π with
outermost logical symbol ∀. Let T consist of all terms t for which Et occurs in Π . Above Π ⇒ Λ, write the sequent
Π , {Ai(t) | i ∈ α, t ∈ T } ⇒ Λ.
Note that, if {Et | t ∈ TL} ⊆ Π , we can always carry out this step, since there is at least one constant in L, which
implies that there is at least one expression of the form Et in {Et | t ∈ TL}, and thus in Π .
n ≡ 6: L∃ reduction. Let α be a set such that {∃xi Ai (xi ) | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Π with
outermost logical symbol ∃ to which no reduction has yet been applied. Introduce fresh variables {yi | i ∈ α} of L′,
and above Π ⇒ Λ write the sequent
Π , {Ai(yi ), Eyi | i ∈ α} ⇒ Λ.
n ≡ 7: R∃ reduction. Defined in a similar way to L∀ reduction. Let α be a set such that {∃xi Ai (xi ) | i ∈ α} consists
exactly of all formulas in Λ with outermost logical symbol ∃. Let T consist of all terms t for which Et occurs in Π .
AboveΠ ⇒ Λ, write the sequent
Π ⇒ {Ai (t) | i ∈ α, t ∈ T },Λ.
n ≡ 8: if Π ⇒ Λ is an axiom of LJE∞ or a sequent in ΣL, then stop. If this is not the case, write the same sequent
Π ⇒ Λ above it and proceed to n + 1.
This completes the definition of reduction trees.
The following Lemma 7.8 is non-trivial and crucial in the completeness proof. It is an analogue of a lemma in [27]
for LJ, and its main ingredient is the following generalization of Ko¨nig’s Lemma.
Proposition 7.7 (A Generalized Ko¨nig’s Lemma, Takeuti [27]). Let X be any set. Let ∗(·) be a property on partial
functions f : X → {0, 1}. If
(1) ∗( f ) holds if and only if there is a finite subset Z ⊆ X such that ∗( f ↑ Z) (here f ↑ Z is the restriction of f to
Z), and
(2) ∗( f ) holds for all total functions f on X,
then there exists a finite set X ′ ⊆ X such that ∗( f ) for any f with X ′ ⊆ dom( f ) (dom( f ) is the domain of f ).
Proof. For completeness sake, we repeat Takeuti’s proof from [27]. Let Y be the product of |X | times {0, 1}. Give
{0, 1} the discrete topology and Y the product topology. Since {0, 1} is compact, so is Y by Tychonoff’s theorem. For
maps f and g, call g an extension of f when dom( f ) ⊆ dom(g) and f and g are equal on dom( f ). For every f with
finite domain, let
N f ≡def {g | g is total and an extension of f }.
Furthermore, let
C ≡def {N f | dom( f ) is finite and ∗( f )}.
C is an open cover of Y . Therefore, C has a finite subcover, say N f1, . . . ,N fn . Let
X ′ = dom( f1) ∪ · · · ∪ dom( fn).
Then X ′ satisfies the theorem: assume X ′ ⊆ dom( f ). Let g be a total extension of f . Then ∗(g) by 2. Also, there
exists an i ≤ n such that g ∈ N fi . Thus g is an extension of both f and fi . Since dom( fi ) ⊆ dom( f ), it follows that
f is an extension of fi . Therefore, ∗( f ) by 1. 
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Lemma 7.8. If a sequent S is not provable in LJE∞(ΣL), then its reduction tree has a branch along which all
sequents are underivable in LJE∞(ΣL).
Proof. In this proof, provable will always mean provable in LJE∞(ΣL), and  stands for LJE∞(ΣL) . We prove the
lemma by proving the following: if, in a reduction tree, Γβ ⇒ Δβ (β = 1, 2 . . . , α) are all the immediate successors
of Γ ⇒ Δ, then, if all these successors are provable, so is Γ ⇒ Δ. Recall that a sequent Π ⇒ Λ is provable when
there are finite Π ′ ⊆ Π and Λ′ ⊆ Λ such that Π ′ ⇒ Λ′ is provable.
We distinguish by cases according to the rule that is applied to Γ ⇒ Δ, resulting in the immediate successors
Γβ ⇒ Δβ .
L∧ reduction: then Γ ⇒ Δ has one upper sequent, which is of the form Γ , {Ai0, Ai1 | i ∈ α} ⇒ Δ, where
Ai0 ∧ Ai1 are all the formulas in Γ with outermost logical symbol ∧ to which no reduction has been applied yet. By
assumption, there are finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and Δ′ ⊆ Δ and Bi ∈ {Ai0, Ai1} for i ≤ n such that  Γ ′, B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ Δ′.
Hence  Γ ′, {Ai0, Ai1 | i ≤ n} ⇒ Δ′, which again implies  Γ ′, {Ai0 ∧ Ai1 | i ≤ n} ⇒ Δ′. Thus  Γ ⇒ Δ.
R∧ reduction: then Γ ⇒ Δ has immediate successors Γ ⇒ {Ai f (i) | i ∈ α},Δ for any map f : α → {0, 1}, where
{Ai0 ∧ Ai1 | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Δ with outermost logical symbol ∧. By assumption, for all
f : α → {0, 1} there are finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ , Δ′ ⊆ Δ and n f ∈ ω such that we have  Γ ′ ⇒ {Ai f (i) | i ≤ n f },Δ′. Now
we are going to use the generalized Ko¨nig’s Lemma. We define a property ∗(·) on the partial functions f : α → {0, 1}
as follows (dom( f ) denotes the domain of f ):
∗( f ) ≡ ∃m∃a1 . . . am ∈ dom( f )∃ finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ ,Δ′ ⊆ Δ :
 Γ ′ ⇒ {Ai f (ai ) | i ≤ m},Δ′.
Then conditions (1) and (2) of the generalized Ko¨nig’s Lemma 7.7 are satisfied. Hence there is a finite subset β ⊆ α
such that ∗( f ) whenever β ⊆ dom( f ). Let F be the collection of f for which dom( f ) = β. Thus, for all f ∈ F ,
there are finite Γ f ⊆ Γ and Δ f ⊆ Δ such that
 Γ f ⇒ {Ai f (i) | i ∈ β},Δ f .
Hence, by weakening and repeated application of R∧, one obtains
 {Γ f | f ∈ F} ⇒ {Ai0 ∧ Ai1 | i ∈ β}, {Δ f | f ∈ F}.
This implies that  Γ ⇒ Δ.
The case R∨ is similar to L∧, and L∨ and L→ are similar to R∧.
L∃ reduction: then Γ ⇒ Δ has an immediate successor
Γ , {Ai (yi ), Eyi | i ∈ α} ⇒ Δ,
where {∃xi Ai (xi ) | i ∈ α} consists exactly of all formulas in Δ with outermost logical symbol ∃. By assumption,
there are finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ andΔ′ ⊆ Δ and n ∈ ω such that
 Γ ′, {Ai (yi ), Eyi | i ≤ n} ⇒ Δ′.
Applications of L∃ imply that Γ ⇒ Δ is then provable too.
The cases R∃ and L∀ are similar. This proves the lemma. 
Theorem 7.9. For all sets of finite closed sequents S and all closed sequents S in L′:
S eL S implies S ∞L S.
Proof. We treat the case that S is empty and leave the other case to the reader. The proof that we give is similar to
the elegant completeness proof for LJ in [27]. In the proof, we will write  for LJE∞(ΣL). Let S = (Γ ⇒ Δ) be a
closed sequent and assume that 
 S. We will construct a L-model K such that K 
e S in the following way. It will
be defined in ω many steps using reduction trees, which will be the nodes of K . We assume that L′ contains infinitely
many variables that do not occur in S. The nodes in the model will be triples of numbers, a reduction tree, and a branch
in the tree along which all sequents are unprovable.
284 M. Baaz, R. Iemhoff / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 142 (2006) 269–295
Step 0: Let T0 be the reduction tree for Γ , {Et | t ∈ TL} ⇒ Δ. Since 
 Γ ⇒ Δ , also

 Γ , {Et | t ∈ TL} ⇒ Δ.
By Lemma 7.8, there is a branch b0 in T0 containing only unprovable sequents. Let (0, T0, b0) be a node (the root) in
K and proceed to the next step.
Step i + 1: For any reduction tree T with branch b along which all sequents are unprovable constructed at step
i , we consider Π and Λ, which are the respective unions of the formulas in the antecedents and succedents along b.
Note that thus 
 Π ⇒ Λ. Let k range over all formulas in Λ with outermost logical symbol → or ∀. We proceed in
the following way.
If k is a formula of the form A → B , then construct the reduction tree Tk for Π , A ⇒ B . Note that 
 Π , A ⇒ B .
Thus, by Lemma 7.8 there is a branch bk in Tk containing only unprovable sequents. We add the node (i + 1, Tk, bk)
to the model, let it be an immediate successor of (i, T, b), and proceed to the next step i + 2.
If k is a formula ∀x A(x), then construct the reduction tree Tk for Π , Ey ⇒ A(y), where y is a variable in L that
has not yet occurred in the construction of K . Observe that, if Π , Ey ⇒ A(y) is derivable, then so is Π ⇒ ∀x Ax ,
since y does not occur inΠ . Thus 
 Π , Ey ⇒ A(y), and whence, by Lemma 7.8, there is a branch bk in Tk containing
only unprovable sequents. We add the node (i + 1, Tk, bk) to the model, let it be an immediate successor of (i, T, b),
and proceed to the next step i + 2.
Nodes constructed at different moments are different: if, at stage i , treating the As leads in some cases to the same
reduction trees T with branch b of unprovable sequents, then we assume that we add extra labels to (i, T, b) to account
for the different occurrences of A at that step.
This process is continued ω times. Let W be the union of all triples that have been constructed, and let  be the
reflexive transitive closure of the immediate successor relation constructed at the stages. Define D to be the set of all
terms appearing in the construction. Given a node k = (i, T, b), letΠk and Λk be the respective unions of the formulas
in the antecedents and succedents along b. Then define an interpretation I as follows:
Ik(R) ≡def {d¯ ∈ D | R(d¯) ∈ Πk},
and Ik is the identity on function symbols: Ik( f )(a¯) = f (a¯) ∈ D. Since L contains at least one constant c, it also
implies that Ik(E) is nonempty. Note that K = ((W,), D, I ) is indeed a Kripke existence model. The fact that we
started with the sequent Γ , {Et | t ∈ TL} ⇒ Δ implies that Et ∈ Πk for all k and all terms t in L. Hence K e Et
for all terms t ∈ TL, and thus K is an L-model. It is not difficult to show by formula induction that we have
A ∈ Πk ⇒ k e A
A ∈ Λk ⇒ k 
e A.
We treat the case A = B → C and leave the other cases to the reader. This will complete the theorem.
First assume B → C ∈ Πk . We have to show that k e B → C . Therefore, consider l  k such that l e B . Thus,
by the induction hypothesis, B ∈ Πl . By the construction of the reduction tree, C ∈ Πl or B ∈ Λl . Since B 
∈ Λl ,
otherwise the branch would be derivable, it follows that C ∈ Πl , and thus l e C .
Second, assume B → C ∈ Λk . By the construction of the model, there is a node l  k such that B ∈ Πl and
C ∈ Λl . This implies that l e B and l 
e C . Hence k 
e B → C . 
By Lemma 7.2 and Theorems 7.4 and 7.9, it follows that:
Corollary 7.10. For all sets of finite closed sequents S and all finite closed sequents S in L′:
S L S if and only if S eL S.
Corollary 7.11. For all sets of finite closed sequents S and all finite closed sequents S in L′: S L S if and only if
K e S for all L-models K based on frames that are well-founded trees that force S.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 7.2 and Theorem 7.4 and the proof of Theorem 7.9. 
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8. ESkolemization
In this section we prove that, in LJE(ΣL), eSkolemization is sound and complete for all closed sequents in which
all strong quantifiers are existential. There then follows the main theorem of the paper, Theorem 8.13, which is an
extension of Theorem 8.1, in that it shows that eSkolemization is sound and complete for all closed sequents in which
all strong quantifiers are almost existential or that belong to M (the definition of M in Section 2.3). The definition of
almost existential quantifiers is given below.
Theorem 8.1. Let ∃x B(x, y¯) be a formula that occurs negatively in a closed sequent S in L, is not in the scope of
strong quantifiers, and where y¯ are the variables of the weak quantifiers in the scope of which B occurs. If S′ is the
result of replacing in S the formula ∃x B(x, y¯) by E f (y¯) ∧ B( f (y¯), y¯), where f is a fresh function symbol not in L,
then
L S if and only if L S′.
Proof. The direction from left to right follows from Lemma 3.2. For the direction from right to left, it is more
convenient to work with sentences instead of closed sequents. Therefore, let A′ be the result of replacing a negative
occurrence of ∃x B(x, y¯), in a sentence A that does not occur in the scope of strong quantifiers, by a formula
E f (y¯) ∧ B( f (y¯), y¯), where f is a fresh function symbol from L′\L not occurring in A and y¯ are the variables
of the weak quantifiers in the scope of which B occurs. Arguing by contradiction, assume 
eL⇒ A. We show that
eL⇒ A′. By Corollary 7.11, we can pick a well-founded tree model K that refutes A. Let 0 be an element in D such
that E0 is forced at the root r of K .
Some notation: in this proof, L stands for the language of A. Thus it is the language of A′ without f . V denotes
the set of variables in L′. Let G be the set of all function symbols (including constants) in L. So all g ∈ G are distinct
from f and G is finite. g and gi range over elements in G. Recall that, for a sequence d¯ and a set X , d¯ ∈ X means
that all elements of d¯ belong to X , and d¯ 
∈ X means that some d ∈ d¯ does not belong to D.
Case 1. We first treat the case that all functions in L and f have arity 1, and after that comment on the general
case. Thus a formula ∃x B(x, y) is replaced by E f y ∧ B( f y, y) in going from A to A′. Some notation: we will need
so many brackets that we often write f d for f (d) and g f d for g( f (d)), etc.
Let us first sketch the idea of the proof. Also keep in mind the informal discussion on constructing counter models
in Section 2.4. The aim is to construct a counter model K ′ to A′. K ′ will have the same set of nodes as K but a bigger
domain D′ ⊇ D, which we construct inductively in steps i . To this end, we will use a partial function
 : K × (D′ ∪ V) → (D ∪ V).
We write (k, d) ↓ if (k, d) is an element in D ∪ V and (k, d) ↑ otherwise, i.e. if (k, d) is undefined. The idea
is that, at K ′, k, the element d ′ ∈ D′ corresponds to the element (k, d ′) ∈ D at K , k. At every step we consider the
nodes in K and (k, d) for some d ∈ Di ⊆ D′, where i is already defined. If K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d)), we choose a
witness (k, f d) in D such that
K , k e E(k, f d) ∧ B((k, f d), (k, d)).
This (k, f d) will then correspond to f d in D′, i.e. we extend the domain Di with these elements f d . Thus, for
these f d , (k, f d) ↓. If K , k 
e ∃x B(x, (k, d)), we do not need an element in D to which f d corresponds, and
we put (k, f d) ↑. Of course, we also have to extend the interpretations of the function symbols in G to the new
domain. That is, we have to define the interpretation I ′k(g) of g in K ′ for the new elements f d . To this end, we just
add, for g = g1 . . . gm , elements g( f d) to Di and let I ′k be the identity on them, i.e. I ′k(g)( f d) = g( f d). We put
(k, gd) = Ik(g)((k, d)) if (k, d) ↓ and (k, gd) ↑ otherwise.
Our aim is for the final model K ′ to satisfy
K ′, k e E( f d) ∧ B( f d, d) ⇔ K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d)). (9)
We will obtain this in the following way. For the d¯ such that (k, di ) ↓ for all di ∈ d¯ , for all predicates P including E
we define
∀d¯ ∈ D′ : K ′, k e P(d¯) ⇔ K , k e P((k, d¯)). (10)
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In particular, if K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d)), we put K ′, k e E( f d). We cannot extend this to all d , as for some we might
have (k, d) ↑. However, we will put K ′, k 
e Ed for all these d , and therefore they play no role in the evaluation of
the quantifiers in K ′. As we will see, this then will make K ′ into a counter model of A′.
Two final remarks before the formal proof starts. First, the reason for the partiality of  is that, if we would require
that all elements in D′ correspond to an element of D, then (10) would violate the upwards persistency in K ′. Namely,
suppose k  l and k  l ′, and suppose k does not force and l and l ′ do force ∃x B(x, d) in K . Suppose K , l  B(e, d)
and K , l ′  B(e′, d). Thus we put (l, f d) = e and (l ′, f d) = e′, and we also have to associate an element of D
to (k, d): it may be e, e′ or another element in D. In case e 
= e′, this would cause problems, as then (k, d) cannot
be equal to both; say (k, d) 
= e. Then, in case we would have defined forcing in K ′ as in (10), we might have
K , k  P(k, d) and K , l 
 P(l, d). Therefore, we would have
K ′, k  Pd K ′, l 
 Pd,
which would make P not upwards persistent in K ′.
Second, in the example treated in Section 2.4 we interpreted the Skolem constant c as an element in the domain D.
Thus we did not extend D by c, as we have done in the proof sketch above. The reason is that, in general, we cannot
always let c or f d be an element of D, as the example above illustrates.
Now we start with the formal proof. The domain D′ of K ′ is inductively defined as follows:
D0 ≡def D ∪ {g1 . . . gn(d) | d ∈ D, g j ∈ G}
Di+1 ≡def { f (d), g1 . . . gn f (d) | d ∈ Di , g j ∈ G}
D′ ≡def ⋃i Di .
We define the following sets and the partial function (k, d) : K × (D′ ∪ V) → (D ∪ V) simultaneously in an
inductive way. We start by stipulating
∀d ∈ D ∪ V : (k, d) = d ∧ (k, g1 . . . gm(d)) = Ik(g1) . . . Ik(gm)(d).
(Recall that V is the set of variables in L′.) We write (k, d) ↑ if (k, d) is not defined, and (k, d) ↓ otherwise. Next
we give, for a given Di such that (k, d) is defined for all d ∈ Di , the definitions of (k, d) for all d ∈ Di+1, i.e. for
(k, f d) and (k, g1 . . . gn f d). Define, for d ∈ Di ,
Xd = {k ∈ K | (k, d) ↓, K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d)),
∀l ≺ k (K , l 
e ∃x B(x, (k, d)))},
Zd = {k | (k, d) ↓, K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d))}.
Note that, for all k such that (k, d) ↓, either k ∈ Zd , or K , k e ¬∃x B(x, (k, d)), or there exists at least one l  k
such that l ∈ Xd . For k ∈ Zd , we define
kd = smallest l  k s.t. l ∈ Zd .
Note that kd is well-defined, because K is a well-founded tree. Observe that l  k ∈ Zd implies that K , l e
∃x B(x, (k, d)). That is not the same as l ∈ Zd , i.e. K , l e ∃x B(x, (l, d)). However, we will see that the latter
follows from the former in the next claim.
Now, for all nodes k ∈ Xd , choose an element (k, f d) ∈ D such that
K , k e E(k, f d) ∧ B((k, f d), (k, d)).
We extend this definition to all nodes k and all elements in Di+1 via
(k, f d) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(k, f d) if k ∈ Xd
(kd, f d) if k ∈ Zd
↑ if k 
∈ Zd
(k, g1 . . . gm f d) =
{
Ik(g1) . . . Ik(gm)((k, f d)) if (k, f d) ↓
↑ if (k, f d) ↑.
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Here, the gi range over elements in G. Define
Uk ≡def D0 ∪ { f d, g1 . . . gn f (d) | k ∈ Zd , gi ∈ G}
= D0 ∪ { f d, g1 . . . gn f (d) | gi ∈ G, (k, d) ↓, K , k  ∃x B(x, (k, d))}.
Claim 8.2.
k ∈ Zd ∧ l  k ⇒ (11)
(k, d) ↓ ∧ (l, d) ↓ ∧ (k, d) = (l, d) ∧ l ∈ Zd ∧ kd = ld .
∀k∀d ∈ Uk∀l  k : Uk ⊆ Ul ∧ (k, d) ↓ ∧ (l, d) ↓ ∧ (k, d) = (l, d). (12)
Proof of Claim. We first show that (11) implies (12). For an expression e = g1 . . . gn f d or e = f d , where gi ∈ G,
assume l  k, e ∈ Uk . Hence k ∈ Zd . Thus (k, d) ↓, (l, d) ↓, (k, d) = (l, d) and l ∈ Zd by (11). Therefore,
e ∈ Ul , which shows that Uk ⊆ Ul . The definition of  implies that (k, f d) ↓, (l, f d) ↓, and (k, f d) = (l, f d).
Therefore, also (k, e) ↓, (l, e) ↓ and (k, e) = (l, e). This proves (12).
To show (11), assume l  k ∈ Zd . It is easy to see that (l, d) ↓ and (k, d) = (l, d) imply l ∈ Zd and kd = ld .
Therefore, we only have to show that (l, d) ↓ and (k, d) = (l, d). We use induction on the i such that d ∈ Di .
For D0, the claim clearly holds. For the induction step, first consider f d such that k ∈ Z f d . Hence (k, f d) ↓.
Observe that whence k ∈ Zd . By the induction hypothesis (l, d) ↓, (k, d) = (l, d), l ∈ Zd and kd = ld . Thus
(k, f d) = (kd, f d) = (ld , f d) = (l, f d) by the definition of . Hence also (l, f d) ↓.
Second, consider e = g1 . . . gn f d and assume k ∈ Ze. Whence (k, e) ↓, thus (k, f d) ↓, and thus k ∈ Zd .
Reasoning as in the case above, we conclude that (k, f d) = (l, f d). Thus also (l, e) ↓ and (k, e) = (l, e) by
the definition of . This proves the claim.
Note that the claim implies that
k ∈ Zd ⇒ K , k e E(k, f d) ∧ B((k, f d), (k, d)). (13)
Namely, read k for l and kd for k: since k  kd ∈ Zd , it follows that (k, d) = (kd , d). The definition of  and
k ∈ Zd imply that (k, f d) = (kd, f d). Since K , kd e E(kd , f d) ∧ B((kd, f d), (kd , d)), this proves that (13)
holds.
To define K ′, we start by defining the interpretations I ′k , which are defined as the identity:
∀d ∈ D′ : I ′k( f )(d) ≡def f (d) ∀d ∈ D′ : I ′k(g)(d) ≡def g(d).
Note that the upwards persistency requirement on terms for the collection of I ′k is satisfied.
We now define the interpretations I ′k on predicates P including E as follows. For e = e1, . . . , en , we let
(k, e¯) = (k, e1), . . . , (k, en):
I ′k(P) ≡def {d¯ ∈ D′ | d¯ ∈ Uk, (k, d¯) ∈ Ik(P)},
in other words, we put
∀k∀d¯ ∈ Uk : K ′, k e P(d¯) ≡def K , k e P
(
(k, d¯)
)
,
∀k∀d¯ 
∈ Uk : K ′, k 
e P(d¯).
What is important from the definition of the I ′ks, and what we will use often, is that
∀d ∈ D′ : K ′, k e Ed ⇔ d ∈ Uk ∧ K , k e E(k, d). (14)
Note that this implies that the interpretation of E in the root of K ′ is nonempty, as it is in K .
Claim 8.3. The upwards persistency requirement is fulfilled:
∀k∀l  k : K ′, k e P(d¯) ⇒ K ′, l e P(d¯).
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Proof of Claim. If d¯ 
∈ Uk , then the implication is immediately clear. Suppose d¯ ∈ Uk and k  l. Hence d¯ ∈ Ul by
(12). Thus it suffices to show that
∀k∀l  k : K , k e P((k, d¯)) ⇒ K , l e P((l, d¯)),
which follows from the persistency of K and the fact that (k, d¯) = (l, d¯), which follows from (12). This proves the
claim.
Observe that, here, upwards persistency would not hold if we would have defined
∀k∀d¯ ∈ D′ : K ′, k e P(d¯) ≡def K , k e P
(
(k, d¯)
)
.
Namely, we then would not have that l  k implies (k, d) = (l, d).
To finish the proof of the theorem, we have to consider instances C(d¯) of subformulas C(x¯) of A. Since we assume
that all bound variables in a proof are different, when we speak about an occurrence of the formula ∃x B(x, y) in A,
it can only be that one occurrence that is replaced in going from A to A′. Thus, also when C(z¯, y) is a subformula
of A, the y can only be the y that occurs in ∃x B(x, y). For subformulas C(z¯, y) of A and for all e¯c ∈ D′ ∪ V ,
we let C(e¯, c) f stand for the replacement in C(e¯, c) of ∃x B(x, c) by E( f c) ∧ B( f c, c). If C(e¯, c) does not contain
∃x B(x, c), then C(e¯, c) f = C(e¯, c). Thus A f = A′. For convenience, we also write C(z¯, y) in case y does not occur
or occurs bounded in C . A few examples:
(∃x B(x, y) → Py) f = (E f y ∧ B( f y, y) → Py)(∃u B(u, v) ∧ ∃x B(x, c)) f z = ∃u B(u, v) ∧ E f c ∧ B( f c, c)
∃y(¬∃x B(x, y)) f = ∃y(¬(E f y ∧ B( f y, y)))
B(x, y) f = B(x, y).
Recall that, for e = e1, . . . , en , we defined (k, e¯) = (k, e1), . . . , (k, en).
Claim 8.4. For every subformula C(z¯, y) of A:
∀k∀ce¯ ∈ Uk : K ′, k e C(e¯, c) f ⇔ K , k e C((k, e¯), (k, c)).
Proof of Claim. With formula induction on C . Let ce¯ ∈ Uk . Observe that every subformula C(x¯, y) of A is a formula
in L. Therefore, if C is a predicate, then it does not contain ∃x B(x, y), whence C(e¯, c) f = C(e¯, c) = P(e¯, c) for
some predicate P . We have to show that
K ′, k e P(e¯, c) ⇔ K , k e P((k, e¯), (k, c)),
which follows directly from the definition of e in K ′. The cases for the connectives follow by induction, since (·) f
commutes with the connectives. In case of implication, use Uk ⊆ Ul for k  l (12). We treat the quantifiers.
∀: Suppose C(z¯, y) = ∀u D(u, z¯, y), where y might possibly be u. Hence C f (e¯, y) = ∀u(D(u, e¯, y) f ). Thus we
have to show:
∀a ∈ D′ : K ′, k e Ea → D(a, e¯, c) f ⇔ ∀a ∈ D : K , k e Ea → D(a, (k, e¯c)).
⇒: Suppose the left side of ⇔ holds, and consider an element a ∈ D such that K , k e Ea. By (14) and the fact
that D ⊆ Uk , K ′, k e Ea. Thus K ′, k e D(a, e¯, c) f . Whence, by the induction hypothesis, K , k e D((k, ae¯c)).
Since a ∈ D, (k, a) = a. Therefore, K , k e D(a, (k, c¯)), and we are done.
⇐: Suppose the right side of ⇔ holds and pick an a ∈ D′ such that K ′, k e Ea. By (14), it follows that a ∈ Uk
and K , k e E (k, a). Since (k, a) ∈ D and the right side of ⇔ holds, K , k e D((k, a), (k, e¯c)). Therefore,
K ′, k e D(a, e¯, c)) f by the induction hypothesis, and we are done.
∃: Suppose C(z¯, y) = ∃u D(u, z¯, y). There are three possibilities: u = y, u = x or u 
= x and u 
= y. The case
u = y, and u 
= x and u 
= y, are the same. We start with this case. Hence C(e¯, y) f = ∃u(D(u, e¯, y) f ), where u is
possibly equal to y. Thus we have to show that, for all k,
∃a ∈ D′ : K ′, k e Ea ∧ D(a, e¯, c) f ⇔ ∃a ∈ D : K , k e Ea ∧ D(a, (k, e¯c)).
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⇒: Suppose the left side of ⇔ holds, and consider an element a ∈ D′ such that K ′, k ′ e Ea ∧ D(a, e¯, c) f .
By (14), it follows that a ∈ Uk and K , k e E(k, a). By the induction hypothesis, we then also have K , k e
D((k, a), (k, e¯c)), and we are done.
⇐: Suppose the right side of ⇔ holds and pick an a ∈ D such that K , k e Ea ∧ D(a, (k, e¯c)). By (14) and the
fact that D ⊆ Uk , it follows that K ′, k e Ea. Also, since a ∈ D, (k, a) = a. Hence K ′, k e D(a, e¯, c)) f by the
induction hypothesis, and we are done.
The final case u = x : C(z¯, y) = ∃x B(x, y) and C(c) f = E( f c) ∧ B( f c, c). We have to show that
K ′, k e E( f c) ∧ B( f c, c) ⇔ K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, c)).
⇒: Suppose K ′, k e E( f c) ∧ B( f c, c). By (14), also K , k e E(k, f c) and f (c) ∈ Uk . Hence K , k e
B((k, f c), (k, c)) by the induction hypothesis, as B f ( f c, c) = B( f c, c). Since (k, f c) ∈ D, this implies
K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, c)).
⇐: Only here, the trick in the construction of f is used. Suppose K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, c)). Observe that c ∈ Uk
implies (k, c) ↓ by (12). Hence k ∈ Zc. Thus, by (13),
K , k e E(k, f c) ∧ B((k, f c), (k, c)).
Also, since k ∈ Zc, f (c) ∈ Uk . Observe that
(
E f c ∧ B( f c, c)) f = E f c ∧ B( f c, c). Therefore, K ′, k e
E( f c) ∧ B( f c, c) by the induction hypothesis. This proves the claim.
It follows from the last claim that
K ′, k e A′ ⇔ K , k e A.
Therefore, K ′ 
e A′, as desired. This completes Case 1 of the proof.
Case 2. We will not treat this part of the proof in all detail, but just mention the main differences. In this case, f
and the functions in G may have any arity ≥ 0. Thus a formula ∃x B(x, y¯) is replaced by B( f y¯, y¯) in going from A to
A′, where y¯ are the variables of all the weak quantifiers in the scope of which B occurs. Note that B contains no other
free variables, as it is not in the scope of another strong quantifier by assumption. Assume f has arity s and gi ∈ G
has arity si . Thus y¯ has length s. For any set X , we write Xs for the set of sequences of elements in X of length s.
Again, we will often write f d¯ for f (d¯) and g( f d¯) for g( f (d¯)), etc. When we write gi(d¯), we implicitly assume that
the length of d¯ is si , and similarly for f . (k, d¯) = (k, d1), . . . , (k, dn). We write (k, d¯) ↓ if (k, d) ↓ for all
d ∈ d¯, and (k, d¯) ↑ otherwise. d ∈ e¯ means that d occurs in some element of e¯.
To define the Di , we need an auxiliary operation. Given a set X , X G =⋃ Xi is the closure of X under the functions
in G:
X0 ≡def X ∪ {g(d¯) | d¯ ∈ X, g ∈ G}
X¯ i+1 ≡def Xi ∪ {g(d¯) | d¯ ∈ Xi , g ∈ G}.
Then we define
D0 ≡def DG
Di+1 ≡def
(⋃
j≤i
D j ∪
{
f (d¯) | d¯ ∈ ⋃
j≤i
D j
})G
D′ ≡def ⋃
i
Di .
Again, we define the following sets and partial function  : K × (D′ ∪ V) → (D ∪ V) simultaneously in an inductive
way. They are only slight variations of the definitions above, fit to deal with arities other than 1. We start by stipulating
∀d ∈ D ∪ V : (k, d) = d and ∀ g(d¯) ∈ DG : (k, g(d¯)) = Ik(g)((k, d¯)).
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Given the definition of  for Di , we show how to extend it to Di+1. Consider a d¯ ∈ Dsi such that at least one element
of d¯ is not in
⋃
j<i D j :
Xd¯ = {k | k ∈ K , (k, d¯) ↓, K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d¯)),
∀l ≺ k (K , l 
e ∃x B(x, (k, d¯)))}
Zd¯ = {k | k ∈ K , (k, d¯) ↓, K , k e ∃x B(x, (k, d¯))}.
Note that the Zd¯ are only defined for sequences d¯ of length s. For k ∈ Zd¯ , we define
kd¯ = smallest l  k s.t. l ∈ Zd¯ .
Now, for all nodes k ∈ Xd¯ , we choose a node (k, f d¯) ∈ D such that
K , k e E(k, f d¯)) ∧ B((k, f d¯), (k, d¯)).
Then we extend this definition to all k via
(k, f d¯) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(k, f d¯) if k ∈ Xd¯
(kd¯, f d¯) if k ∈ Zd¯
↑ if k 
∈ Zd¯ .
Then we define inductively for d¯ ∈ (⋃ j≤i D j ∪ { f (d¯) | d¯ ∈ ⋃ j≤i D j })G :
(k, gd¯) =
{
Ik(g)((k, d¯)) if (k, d¯) ↓
↑ otherwise.
Define
Uk ≡def
(
D0 ∪ { f (d¯) | k ∈ Zd¯}
)G =
= (D0 ∪ { f (d¯) | (k, d¯) ↓, K , k  ∃x B(x, (k, d¯))})G .
Claim 8.5.
k ∈ Zd¯ ∧ l  k ⇒ (15)
(k, d¯) ↓ ∧ (l, d¯) ↓ ∧ (k, d¯) = (l, d¯) ∧ l ∈ Zd¯ ∧ kd¯ = ld¯ .
∀k∀d ∈ Uk∀l  k : Uk ⊆ Ul ∧ (k, d) ↓ ∧ (l, d) ↓ ∧ (k, d) = (l, d). (16)
Proof of Claim. The proof of (15) is analogous to the proof of (11) above; use induction on i such that d¯ ∈ Di , with a
subinduction on the number of symbols in d¯ . We only show that (15) implies (16). Assume (15) and d ∈ Uk and k  l.
Let f (e¯1), . . . , f (e¯n) be all the terms of the form f (e¯) in d that are not in the scope of another term of the form f (a¯).
Observe that k ∈ Ze¯i . Hence (k, e¯i ) ↓, (l, e¯i ) ↓, (k, e¯i ) = (l, ei ), ke¯i = le¯i , and l ∈ Ze¯i by (15). The definition of
 implies (k, f e¯i ) ↓, (l, f e¯i ) ↓, and (k, f e¯i ) = (l, f e¯i ). Whence (k, d) ↓, (l, d) ↓, and (k, d) = (l, d) by
the definition of  on elements of the form g(e¯). This proves (16), and thereby the claim.
Note that the claim implies
k ∈ Zd¯ ⇒ K , k e E(k, f d¯) ∧ B((k, f d¯), (k, d¯)). (17)
To define K ′, we define the interpretations I ′k for K ′ for terms and predicates similarly as in Case 1:
∀d¯ ∈ D′ : I ′k( f )(d¯) ≡def f (d¯) ∀d¯ ∈ D′ : I ′k(g)(d¯) ≡def g(d¯).
I ′k(P) ≡def {d¯ ∈ D′ | d¯ ∈ Uk, (k, d¯) ∈ Ik(P)} ,
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in other words, we put
∀k∀d¯ ∈ Uk : K ′, k e P(d¯) ≡def K , k e P
(
(k, d¯)
)
,
∀k∀d¯ 
∈ Uk : K ′, k 
e P(d¯).
It is not difficult to see that
∀d ∈ D′ : K ′, k e Ed ⇔ d ∈ Uk ∧ K , k e E(k, d). (18)
Claim 8.6. The upwards persistency requirement is fulfilled:
∀k∀l  k : K ′, k e P(d¯) ⇒ K ′, l e P(d¯).
Proof of Claim. Analogous to the proof of Claim 8.3 above.
As in Case 1, for subformulas C(z¯, y¯) of A and for all sequences e¯c¯ ∈ D′ ∪ V , we let C(e¯, c¯) f stand for the
replacement in C(e¯, c¯) of ∃x B(x, c¯) by E( f c¯) ∧ B( f c¯, c¯). Thus A f = A′.
Claim 8.7. For every subformula C(z¯, y¯) of A:
∀k∀c¯e¯ ∈ Uk : K ′, k e C f (e¯, c¯) ⇔ K , k e C((k, e¯), (k, c¯)).
Proof of Claim. Analogous to the proof of Claim 8.4 above.
Given these definitions and claims, the proof proceeds in exactly the same way as in Case 1. This completes the
second case, and thereby the proof of the theorem. 
Corollary 8.8. For each closed sequent S in L′ in which all strong quantifiers are existential:
L S if and only if L Ss .
Proof. Let S = S1, . . . , Sn = Ss be the Skolem sequence of S. Then Theorem 8.1 implies that L
Si if and only if L Si+1, and we are done. 
Corollary 8.9. For all closed sequents S in L in which all strong quantifiers are existential:
LJ S if and only if L Ss .
8.10. Extension of the main result
In this section we present an extension of the above result by extending the class of sequents for which Theorem 8.1
applies. This class of formulas is not syntactically defined, and is therefore less useful. However, it contains a
syntactically decidable subclass that strictly extends the closed sequents in which all strong quantifiers are existential:
the class of closed sequents in which all strong universal quantifiers are of the form ∀x¬¬Ax .
Definition 8.11. For a formula A that occurs in a sequent S, S[B/A]p (p for positive) denotes the result of replacing
every positive occurrence of A in S by B . Note that we do not put restrictions on the possible occurrences of free
variables in A or S. We say that all strong quantifiers in S are almost existential if, for every subformula ∀x Ax of S,
it holds that
S[¬∃x¬Ax/∀x Ax]p L S.
Note that we always have
S L S[¬∃x¬Ax/∀x Ax]p.
Thus almost existential sequents are sequents that, as a formula, are equivalent to a formula in which all strong
quantifiers are existential.
Define
S∃ ≡def {S | S a closed sequent in L′ in which all strong quantifiers are almost existential} ∪M.
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Remark 8.12. S∃ contains all sequents in which all strong universal quantifiers are of the form ∀x¬¬Ax . But other
universal quantifiers might be allowed: ⊥ ⇒ ∀x Ax does not belong to the mentioned classes, but every quantifier in
this formula is almost existential.
Theorem 8.13.
∀S ∈ S∃ : L S if and only if L Ss .
Proof. The direction from left to right is clear. If S belongs to M, the equivalence follows from Corollary 4.9.
Therefore, for the other direction we assume that all strong quantifiers in S are almost existential and that L Ss .
Let S′ be the result of replacing every strong quantifier ∀x Bx in S by ¬∃x¬Bx . Then all strong quantifiers in S′ are
existential. Note that, because
L (Et → Bt) ⇒ ¬(Et ∧ ¬Bt),
we have Ss L (S′)s . Since, by Corollary 8.8,
L S′ if and only if L (S′)s ,
L S follows. 
Corollary 8.14.
∀S ∈ S∃ ∩ SL : LJ S if and only if L Ss .
Using the result in Section 4.10, we can conclude the following.
Corollary 8.15. For the fragment of sequents in S∃ without weak quantifiers, derivability in L is decidable.
8.16. No total Skolemization
In this section we give examples that show that eSkolemization cannot be sound and complete for all sequents.
Furthermore, we discuss some conditions that, when satisfied by an alternative Skolemization method, imply that the
method cannot be complete.
Counterexamples showing that eSkolemization is not complete are, e.g.
⇒ ∀x¬¬(Ax ∨ ¬Ax) ⇒ ¬¬∀x(Ax ∨ ¬Ax).
The first formula is derivable; the second one is not. Their eSkolemizations are the derivable, and equivalent, sequents
⇒ (Ec → ¬¬(Ac ∨ ¬Ac)) ⇒ ¬¬(Ec → Ac ∨ ¬Ac).
Another example of the incompleteness of eSkolemization is given by the double negation shift DNS:
∀x¬¬Ax ⇒ ∀x¬¬Ax . (19)
The eSkolemization DNSs of DNS is
∀x¬¬Ax ⇒ ¬¬(Ec → Ac).
Now (⇒ DNSs) is derivable in LJE(ΣL), while (⇒ DNS) is not. This is no coincidence, as the following theorem
shows.
Proposition 8.17. If (·)∗ is a transformation on sequents that inductively replaces strong quantifiers ∀x A(x) by
E f (y¯) → A∗( f (y¯)) and that commutes with the connectives, then it cannot hold that, for all S,
L S ⇔ L S∗. (20)
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Proof. Let c denote f (y¯). Let (·)∗ be as in the theorem. Then
(∀x¬¬A(x))∗ = (Ec → ¬¬A∗(c)) ≡ ¬¬(Ec → A∗(c)) = (¬¬∀x A(x))∗.
Since

L∀x¬¬A(x) ⇒ ¬¬∀x A(x),
(20) implies that

L∀x¬¬A(x) ⇒ (Ec → ¬¬A∗(c)).
Since
L∀x¬¬A(x) ⇒ ∀x¬¬A(x),
(20) implies also that
L∀x¬¬A(x) ⇒ (Ec → ¬¬A∗(c)).
A contradiction. 
The following proposition is the analogue of the proposition above for LJ.
Proposition 8.18. If (·)∗ is a transformation on sequents that inductively replaces strong quantifiers Qx A(x) by
A∗( f (y¯)) and that commutes with the connectives, then it cannot hold that, for all A,
LJ  S ⇔ LJ  S∗. (21)
Clearly, the above theorems imply that at least the two “natural” ways of Skolemization, the standard one (·)S and
the alternative one (·)s , cannot work.
The following is a slight strengthening of the above observations.
Proposition 8.19. Let (·)∗ be a transformation on sequents such that in LJ (¬∃x¬Ax)∗ ⇒ (¬¬∀x Ax)∗ is derivable.
Then it cannot hold that, for all S,
LJ  S ⇔ LJ  S∗.
Also, similarly for LJE(ΣL) instead of LJ.
Proof. The following observation suffices:
LJ  ¬∃x¬Ax ⇒ ¬∃x¬Ax
LJ 
 ¬∃x¬Ax ⇒ ¬¬∀x Ax . 
9. Corollaries for IQCE
By the equivalence between LJE and IQCE as discussed in Section 5, we obtain the following corollaries for IQC.
We let ΦLbe the equivalent of ΣL for formulas:
ΦL≡def {Et | t ∈ TL}.
Define
F∃ ≡def {A | A a sentence in L′, all strong quantifiers in A are
almost existential} ∪ {A | ⇒ A belongs to M}.
Corollary 9.1.
∀A ∈ F∃ : ΦLIQCE A if and only if ΦLIQCE As .
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Corollary 9.2.
∀A ∈ F∃ ∩ FL : IQC A if and only if ΦLIQCE As .
Corollary 9.3. For the fragment of sentences S in F∃ without weak quantifiers, ΦLIQCE is decidable.
10. Questions
There are too many topics for further research to list them all, but among the most important ones are the following:
• A syntactic proof of the (partial) completeness of eSkolemization.
• A full description of the class of formulas for which eSkolemization is sound and complete.
• An alternative Skolemization method that is sound and complete in IQC for all formulas.
• Extension of the results to intuitionistic logic plus equality. In [25,19] it is shown that, in this case, standard
Skolemization is not even complete for prenex formulas.
• Generalization of the results to other logics, e.g. minimal logic.
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